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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ECONOMIC REGULATION OF PHYSICIANS:
A BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE

THOMAS L. GREANEY*
It is clear from everyday observation that the behavior expected of sellers
of medical care is different from that of businessmen in general.1
[For physicians], [n]onfinancial incentives such as patient outcomes,
autonomy, regret, and peer approval, may have as strong or stronger an
impact on physician behavior than financial incentives.2
INTRODUCTION
With physicians controlling over seventy percent of health care spending,3
regulation of physicians’ economic activities—i.e., laws that affect how
physicians compete, are paid for services, and structure their practices and joint
ventures—is central to healthcare policy. One might therefore expect that,
over the several decades in which they have been grappling with the health
care sector, scholars and regulators might have formed clear notions of how
physicians respond to economic signals and how the law might best structure
financial incentives and penalties. One will be disappointed by the report of
this Article: Relying on simplistic and unrealistic assumptions about physician
behavior, the law has fallen short on both counts.
A theme emphasized in my prior writings is that much of economic
regulatory law has been slow to recognize that markets for health care services
depart from conventional economic assumptions and that market-oriented

* Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Health Law Studies, Saint
Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Sandra Johnson for valuable comments and insights,
and to Annie Harkins for outstanding editorial assistance.
1. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 949 (1963).
2. Robert Town et al., Assessing the Influence of Incentives on Physicians and Medical
Groups, 61 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 80S, 93S (Supp. 2004).
3. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Lee Goldman, Patient Welfare in Managed Care: Six Safeguards,
23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 635, 636 (1998).
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government policies need regulation to work properly.4 Indeed there is
scarcely any dispute among health care economists that myriad market
imperfections in health care complicate almost every regulatory task.
Imperfect information, agency, adverse selection, and moral hazard in
insurance make it difficult to assure that regulations intended to make markets
work more efficiently, or to lessen their undesirable side effects, will succeed.
This Article extends that theme by considering some of the factors underlying
market imperfections. It suggests that the tools of behavioral economics and
the literature on social norms may enrich our understandings of physician
behavior in the market and their responses to regulation.
Given the pervasive complexity and ambiguity of medical decisionmaking,
it is somewhat surprising that behavioral analysis has not garnered greater
attention among scholars or policy makers.5 The quotations at the beginning of
this Article, written by prominent economists forty years apart, acknowledge
the pressing need for a more nuanced account of physicians’ economic
decisionmaking. As she so often has done in her distinguished career,
Professor Johnson, in her leading article in this issue has challenged academics
to reexamine how law should regard physician conduct.6 The new avenues of
research suggested in this Article are a modest addendum to her fine
contribution.
I. WHY REGULATE PHYSICIAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES?
Economic regulatory law in health care concerns two tasks: awarding and
financing the right to receive health services, and regulating exchanges in the
market once they have been allocated.7 Law relies on economics as one tool—
not the only tool, but an important one—to assess both how to parcel out
entitlements and how to regulate the market for distributing them. As a
general matter, the rationale for the latter rests on correcting a market failure,

4. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in
Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857 (2004); Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health
Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE. J. ON REG. 179 (1988).
5. Richard G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics, in BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 195, 195 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007)
(noting the dearth of scholarship applying behavioral economics to health economics despite the
fact that “one might expect that sector to be a breeding ground for applied behavioral
economics”).
6. Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims
Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973 (2009).
7. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1227, 1227 (2003).
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though the specific justification may vary with the ends sought.8 For example,
regulation of physician fees by government payors may rest on imperfections
in information and agency problems; preventing self-referrals may be
grounded on avoiding conflicts of interest associated with imperfect agents;
and licensure and other regulations of entry and conditions of payment rest on
information asymmetry.
Agency and information problems present the most compelling case for
physician regulation. Patients are generally poorly informed about diagnoses
and treatment options even after consultation with professionals because of
their own lack of medical knowledge and, to some extent, the professionals’
inability or reluctance to fill the information gap. For their part, physicians
lack full information about patients’ preferences and as extensive research has
shown, information on efficacy of treatments is scarce.9 Moreover, physicians
may have financial incentives to over-provide or under-provide care, which
undermine their ability to serve as “perfect agents” for their patients.10
Economic analysis adopts a variety of assumptions about both the nature of
the market under study and about human behavior in those markets. Among
other things, it assumes that both buyers and sellers have good—economic
theory likes to say “perfect”—information; that the services or products are
homogeneous; and that buyers and sellers are “rational.” Yet, few markets
exhibit as marked a departure from this theoretical framework as health
services. Patients (buyers) in the market know very little about the quality,
necessity, cost, or alternatives of much of what they get in health care.11 It also
turns out that doctors are poorly informed on many critical items, including
both efficacy of treatment and their patients’ preferences.12 Further, the
services one buys are far from homogeneous: hospitals vary significantly in
quality, amenities, reputation, and convenience; doctors vary in training, effort,
caring, and communications skills. Complicating things further, the “triple
agency” relationship of doctor-patient-payer means that most health care
transactions go through several levels of intermediaries. For example, you

8. On market failures in health care, see THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
235, 235–41 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008), and PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE
ECONOMICS 468–74 (5th ed. 1999).
9. See generally E. Haavi Morreim, A Dose of Our Own Medicine: Alternative Medicine,
Conventional Medicine, and the Standards of Science, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 222–25
(2003) (noting a number of common medical procedures and treatments, the efficacy of which is
not supported by medical science).
10. See Thomas H. Rice, The Impact of Changing Medicare Reimbursement Rates on
Physician-Induced Demand, 21 MED. CARE 803, 804 (1983).
11. Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Fees and Behavior: Implications for Structuring a Fee
Schedule, in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE 263, 264–66 (Frank A. Sloan & Hirschel
Kasper eds., 2008).
12. See Morreim, supra note 9, at 222–25.
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depend on your doctor to determine what you need and how and where the
service will be delivered; if you have insurance, your insurer shapes the
availability and costs of getting that service; and for most people the purchase
of insurance is limited by the choices made by their employers. Patient
“demand” is pulled (sometimes in the same directions, sometimes in the
opposite directions) by these imperfect agents. Economists term these
phenomena “market imperfections”—meaning the health care market does not
adhere to their model.13 In cases in which these imperfections are serious, they
sometimes use the phrase “market failure”—meaning, unless corrected, these
imperfections dictate that the market will not deliver what economic theory
promises: a mechanism for satisfying our desires, as measured by our
willingness to buy services.
Theoretical and empirical analyses of physician pricing decisions have
long noted that physician behavior does not conform to patterns predicted by
conventional economic theory. Early studies noted that the number of
physicians in markets correlated positively with prices: more physicians,
higher prices—the opposite of the pattern predicted by conventional economic
theory.14 Other studies showed that the volume of services supplied by
physicians increased when prices were lower.15 Observing various anomalous
characteristics of physician markets, economists have advanced several
theoretical frameworks seeking to explain how physicians set their prices. The
first avenue explored was whether cartel behavior, encouraged by professional
associations, enabled physicians to control price and output.16 Others later
advanced a “target income” theory, hypothesizing that when doctors exercise
their power over pricing (and perhaps price discriminate) they may seek to
achieve a fixed “target” income and not to maximize their market power.17
Subsequent work questioned whether they did so in order to better serve their
patients; this scholarship suggested that they might do just the opposite:
increase the number of services to serve their own interests. In the 1980s, the
latter explanation gained currency as physician markets responded to price

13. On economic analysis of market imperfections in physician markets, see David Dranove
& Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1093 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000); Thomas G.
McGuire, Physician Agency, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra, at 461.
14. See, e.g., Victor R. Fuchs, The Supply of Surgeons and the Demand for Operations, 13 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 35, 52–54 (Supp. 1978); see also Charles E. Phelps, Editorial, Induced
Demand—Can We Ever Know Its Extent?, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 355, 359–60 (1986) (responding
to results of Cromwell and Mitchell study which showed that an increase in supply of physicians
performing surgical procedures caused a perverse increase in price).
15. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 10, at 814.
16. Reuben A. Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, 1 J.L. & ECON. 20, 25–32 (1958).
17. Fuchs, supra note 14, at 54.
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controls (which lowered prices) by expanding the number of services.18 The
economic account of this phenomenon is broadly labeled “physician-induced
demand”—giving recognition to the fact that physicians, unlike almost any
other sellers, are able to increase the amount of services they supply because
they exert strong influence over the patient.19 (Simply illustrated, a doctor who
announces “I want to see you every six months” instead of once a year, has
doubled her patient’s demand for routine office visit services.)
The extent to which this behavior results in an inappropriate amount of
care has been the subject of much analysis. Obviously physicians strongly
influence most choices made by patients; the question is whether they exert
“undue” or self-interested influence. Complicating the analysis are issues such
as whether the physician is influencing demand or whether the payment
incentive of managed care is affecting utilization; and whether income or
substitution effects dominate. Though subject to dispute, most economists
agree that some degree of inducement exists.20 Peeling the onion back further,
however, economics offers only a glimpse into the motivations and causal
factors underlying physician inducement. As discussed in Part II of this
Article, a growing literature in other academic disciplines suggests that
professional norms, localized professional customs, and organizational
arrangements contribute strongly to shaping physician attitudes and behavior in
the marketplace.
Empirical work lends support to the claim that physicians’ response to
market signals diverges significantly from what would be expected under
conventional economic assumptions. Undoubtedly, the most well-known
anomaly is the one exposed by John Wennberg and his colleagues at
Dartmouth.21 Their analysis reveals the huge discrepancies in health care costs
(and therefore treatment patterns) among geographic areas around the nation.
This research, which extends back almost thirty years, identifies significant
and persistent variations in medical procedures that are not explained by

18. See McGuire, supra note 11, at 263, 264–66.
19. See generally Fuchs, supra note 14, at 35 (“Many physicians believe that they have
almost unlimited power to shift demand.”); Rice, supra note 10, at 803 (“Demand inducement
occurs when a physician recommends or provides services that differ from what the patient would
choose if he or she had available the same information and knowledge as the physician.”).
20. See Henry J. Aaron, To Find the Answer, One Must Know the Question: Health
Economics and Public Policy, in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 11, at
21, 30 (“[I]f physicians are willing to do more of certain things when paid well to do them, it is
hard to see why the idea that physicians might induce demand was ever controversial.”).
21. John E. Wennberg, Practice Variations and Health Care Reform: Connecting the Dots,
23 HEALTH AFF. VAR140, VAR140 (Web Exclusive, Aug. 7, 2004), available at http://content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.var.140v1; see ELLIOT FISCHER ET AL., TRACKING THE CARE
OF PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS: THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE
(2008).
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demographics, patient characteristics, specialty mix, or outcomes.22 Despite
the solid consensus on the existence of these variations, our understanding of
their causes and the underlying link to physician behavior and motivation is
incomplete.23 Perhaps the most startling lesson drawn from the significant
body of research regarding the complexity and variability of factors
contributing to physicians’ economic behavior is the conclusion reached by
many prominent economists: Economic analysis has no agreed upon
theoretical model of physician behavior.24
II. WHAT CAN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS CONTRIBUTE?
One of the pivotal underlying assumptions of economics is Rational
Choice Theory (RCT). Simply put, RCT assumes that all economic actors
(buyers, sellers, and agents) will seek to maximize their expected utility given
the information available to them.25 While the theory offers the advantage of
simplicity and predictability when applied in modeling behavior, its power to
explain behavior is questioned by behavioral economists. They find RCT is
seriously flawed in many applications, is descriptively inaccurate, and is
subject to systematic errors.26 Behavioralists offer a description of choice that
is based on empirical studies of behavior conducted by social scientists, most
often cognitive and social psychologists and experimental economists. This
body of literature suggests that, especially when operating with limited
information or facing complex choices, individuals often make decisions and
22. Wennberg, supra note 21, at VAR140–41.
23. Henry Aaron observes these variations in care:
The fact is that we just do not understand why ‘Wennberg variations’ exist. Nor do we
have any idea about why they seem not to have narrowed in the three decades since they
were first identified. Indeed, we are not even sure whether they have narrowed or
widened. We still do not know, except in a few areas, whether variations are evidence of
overuse, underuse, or most likely both.
Aaron, supra note 20, at 31 (citation omitted).
24. Thomas McGuire explains that it is “not surprising” that economics lacks such a model,
given that it would have to account for “physician nonprofit-maximizing behavior, demand-side
moral hazard with insurance, physicians’ ability to induce demand, the quality of care, fixed and
nonconstant costs, and the presence of multiple payers.” McGuire, supra note 11, at 276–77.
25. E.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1–2 (2004)
(“[T]he view taken [under economic analysis] will generally be that actors are ‘rational.’ That is,
they are forward looking and behave so as to maximize their expected utility.”); Russell
Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 447 (2004) (“[RCT posits that]
individuals will take actions designed to maximize the differential between expected benefits of
their actions and expected costs.”).
26. See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L.
REV. 237, 241 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266169
(“Individuals’ judgments and choices exhibit behavioral regularities that deviate, predictably,
from the patterns expected of hypothetical rational actors.”).
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select actions based on heuristics, or rules of thumb, rather than on the basis of
“rational” calculations of costs and benefits.27 Because these different
cognitive approaches can lead to behaviors that diverge from those predicted
by neoclassical economics, the impact of legal regulations may depart from
what is presumed under the conventional microeconomic theory underlying
most law and economic principles. At the same time, behavioral economics
can provide important insights into how regulation can direct behavior.
One important observation of behavioral science is that individuals are
“boundedly rational”—they may take shortcuts in making decisions, and these
decision aids frequently result in choices that fail to maximize their utility.
While heuristics may simplify choice, in many cases they result in decisions
that cause individuals to sacrifice utility.28 There is little controversy among
social scientists that “bounded rationality,” resulting from the high cost of
processing information, the cognitive limitations of human beings, or a
combination of the two, is endemic in health care decisionmaking.29
While other taxonomies of behavioral theory are possible, Professor
Stucke offers a useful catalogue of “anomalies” growing out of bounded
rationality:
 loss aversion (namely having significantly greater concern about losing
a given amount than in the utility of gaining the same amount);
 the endowment effect (when we demand much more to give up and sell
an object than what we would be willing to pay to acquire that object);
 status quo bias [(preferring the present state of the world to alternative
states, all other things being equal)] . . . ;
 framing effects ([decisions influenced by] the way the choice is
framed—such as a sure gain or avoiding a loss . . . );
 availability heuristic (when we assess the probability of an event by
asking whether relevant examples come readily to mind);
 representative heuristic (when we ignore the base rates and
overestimate the correlation between what something appears to be and
what something actually is);

27. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000)
(arguing that future law-and-economics scholarship would benefit from using a “law and
behavioral science” analysis, rather than RCT, because RCT’s behavioral assumptions about selfinterest fail to recognize that individuals will often make decisions relying on “a range of
decision-making shortcuts and heuristics”).
28. Id. (“[T]he use of heuristics surely results in the widespread failure of decisionmakers to
maximize their expected utility in particular decision situations.”).
29. Id. at 1075–76.
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 overconfidence bias (when we believe that good things are more likely
(and bad things less likely) than average to happen to us); and
 hindsight bias (our tendency to overestimate the ex ante prediction that
we had concerning the likelihood of an event’s occurrence after
learning that it actually did occur).30
Besides elucidating how preferences and choices are influenced by the
factors described above, behavioral research also shows how individuals
exhibit preferences that are not purely self-interested.31 There is evidence, for
example, “that people care about both giving and receiving fair treatment,” and
that such concerns manifest themselves in making decisions in the market.32
Likewise, compliance with recognized social or professional norms can exert
significant influence over preferences and choices; individuals exhibit a strong
allegiance to such norms and will deviate from expected utility maximization
to comply with their standards.33 Behavioral economists identify other
propensities that cause choices to fall short of the standard assumed under
RCT. For example, individuals may be strongly influenced by fears of regret
from a decision.34 Thus, one may overweigh the probability or magnitude of a
potential adverse result because of the concern that he may regret his decision.
In the context of physician decisionmaking on behalf of patients, behavioral
economists hypothesize that fear of regret may be a significant factor.35
When such biases, norms, and heuristics are present, there are two
important implications for legal analysis and regulatory policy: individuals will
be prone to make judgment errors, and their behavior as actors in the market
may deviate from the precepts of expected utility theory. Though research in
this area is still in its infancy, there are strong reasons to infer that many
decisions made by physicians, which have important economic consequences

30. Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economics at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 527–28 (2007) (bullets added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (footnotes omitted). See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law
& Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (suggesting that a behavioral economic approach to
legal analysis necessarily involves the positive, prescriptive, and normative functions of the law);
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 27, at 1075–76 (discussing the causes of boundedly rational
decisionmaking and its importance in the analysis of legal rules).
31. Tor, supra note 26, at 268.
32. Id. at 268–70.
33. See id. at 268–72. On social norms generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 943–44 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 269 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
35. Frank, supra note 5, at 208 (“[T]he potential for regret [among physicians] is high and
the physician has incentives to attempt to lower the responsibility costs of medical decisionmaking.”).
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and which are governed by legal controls, are subject to the behavioral factors
discussed above.
III. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND PHYSICIANS
Behavioral analysis has begun to make an important contribution in health
care economic policy, especially in exploring issues arising on the demand side
of market. The results of these studies, which should come as no surprise to
persons without economic training, is that patients appear to make choices
about health care that are context-dependent and subject to the pressures of
stress, uncertainty, over-optimism, and other psychological (or perhaps one
should say, human) factors.36 The posited results are cognitive errors and
failures to optimize in accordance with RCT predictions.37 These studies can
give guidance to policymakers in many areas, such as the need to standardize
benefits under health insurance plans.38
Economists have begun to take a closer look at the factors underlying
physician decisionmaking, and they have found a variety of notable proclivities
that underscore the significance of factors identified by behavioral economists
as highly influential. For example, a review of the empirical literature
examining physician prescribing practices and choice of services reveals
systematic errors in predicting outcomes of treatments and that “physicians are
prone to an optimistic bias.”39 In addition, studies suggest that physicians may
overestimate their own abilities relative to others to produce favorable
outcomes.40 The tendency of physicians to rely on habit and their individual
clinical experience, even in the face of peer-reviewed literature and continuing

36. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Costs and Benefits of Health- and Retirement-Related
Choice, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE RISK AND
RESPONSIBILITY 87 (Sheila Burke et al. eds., 2000) (describing effects of uncertainty, risk, and
regret on consumer choice of health and retirement plans); Jane C. Weeks et al., Relationship
Between Cancer Patients’ Predictions of Prognosis and Their Treatment Preferences, 279 JAMA
1709, 1712–14 (1998) (reporting that terminally ill patients, especially those with tendencies to
make optimistic life-extending treatment choices, tended to over-estimate their prognosis despite
contrary physician estimates).
37. Loewenstein, supra note 36, at 91–93.
38. Frank, supra note 5, at 216–17.
39. William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629, 634
(2001) (quoting NICHOLAS CHRISTAKIS, DEATH FORETOLD: PROPHECY AND PROGNOSIS IN
MEDICAL CARE 66 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“‘Virtually all’ of the existing
studies of physicians ‘have documented frequent and large errors in predictions.’ No study finds
a high level of accuracy. The errors tend in a particular direction: ‘physicians are prone to an
optimistic bias.’”) (footnote omitted) (quoting CHRISTAKIS, supra)).
40. See CHRISTAKIS, supra note 39, at 66–69; see also Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 39,
at 634–35 (summarizing studies finding that physicians frequently make inaccurate, overly
optimistic survival predictions).
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medical education, is well-documented.41 As Professor Johnson summarizes
the literature, “[o]nce established, or once learned, practice and prescribing
patterns are hard to alter . . . . Habit may persist even when serious safety
concerns emerge.”42
Another group of studies shows a gap between physicians’ self-reported
practices and their actual behavior. For example, while physicians purport to
place high value on educating patients on health promotion and disease
prevention, they fail to act in accord with those beliefs and overestimate their
own efforts. Chart reviews show that physicians do not provide as much
information to patients as claimed or recollected.43 A third group of studies
shows widespread departure from recommended practice. For example, a
widely reported article in the New England Journal of Medicine, examining
episodes of care for thirty chronic and acute conditions and some preventative
practices, found that patients received care for those treatments an
astonishingly low 55% of the time.44 Given the low costs of adopting the basic
techniques studied, these results might imply that physician treatment
decisions were subject to influences such as status quo bias, saliency, and other
shortcomings.
Another branch of research relevant to physician decisionmaking addresses
how ideas and innovations take hold. In the language of economics, rational
actors “update their priors” by adjusting to new learning and experiences based
on a rational review of all the information available to them. As sociologists
have long known, physicians tend to rely heavily on advice from colleagues,
observed local practice patterns, and informal communications with peers and
trusted sources.45 Doctors’ training may contribute to a tendency to rely on
their own experience or that of trusted colleagues over other sources of
information.46 These behaviors, consistent with the so-called availability

41. See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit
of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 74–82.
42. Id. at 79.
43. Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 640 (citing C. Tracy Orleans et al., Health
Promotion in Primary Care: A Survey of U.S. Family Practictioners, 14 PREVENTIVE MED. 636,
643 (1985)).
44. Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the
United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641 (2003).
45. See Frank, supra note 5, at 207–08 (summarizing studies suggesting physicians’
decisions with regard to innovative technology are consistent with the “availability heuristic,” in
that they rely heavily on “low-cost local sources of information,” such as advice from colleagues,
rather than the scientific literature).
46. Professor Johnson has drawn the link between medical training and clinical behavior as
follows:
Perhaps because of their trust of experience over controlled studies, doctors may tend to
rely on opinions of respected peers and opinion leaders within the profession rather than
on clinical studies or clinical guidelines standing alone. Deference to “group think” and
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heuristic, suggest that physicians’ responses to changing treatment options
sometimes depart from RCT. The apparent responsiveness of some physicians
to even small gifts and remuneration, however, may seem to run in the
opposite direction: that physicians are hyper-sensitive to economic
incentives.47 The response to such de minimis inducements may suggest a
more complex interaction of economic motivation and the need for pragmatic
shortcuts in making decisions.48
A further consideration is the effect of the agency relationship on physician
behavior. In situations in which economic theory would predict that
physicians should act as “perfect agents”—where they have no financial
interest either way in what they decide—they often depart significantly from
recommended practice. The area of drug prescribing is an example. A variety
of studies find that physicians are creatures of habit in prescribing drugs. For
example, physicians have been slow to adopt drugs shown effective in
improving outcomes, such as beta blockers, and have tended to resist switching
to generic drugs or, in some cases, to improved versions of drugs.49
Importantly this “stickiness” in prescribing practices is not caused by lack of
information, training, or learning costs.50 In the language of behavioral
economics, they exhibit status quo bias; they may also be subject to heuristics
based on saliency.
Finally, recall that in making purchasing decisions as medical consumers,
patients are highly subject to deficits identified by behavioral theory.51 The
interplay between patient and doctor in this setting poses a stark challenge to
conventional microeconomic analyses of market behavior. One striking
example cited by Richard Frank illustrates this point. In 1989 the State of New
York sought to employ market forces to encourage better outcomes by
publicizing risk-adjusted outcome data for surgeons performing more than 200
operations at certain hospitals.52 Despite widespread publicity of the data and
apparent public awareness of the significant discrepancies in mortality rates, no

to a hierarchy of opinion may be a learned pattern of decision making adopted in the
doctor’s experience of residency training where the opinion of the attending physician is
revered as authoritative.
Johnson, supra note 41, at 76.
47. Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians
from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252–55 (2003).
48. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 76–82 (describing the multiplicity of noneconomic factors
that undermine the simple “conflict of interest” narrative).
49. Frank, supra note 5, at 199.
50. Judith K. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Physician in the Generic Versus TradeName Prescription Decision, 29 RAND J. ECON. 108, 108 (1999).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
52. Frank, supra note 5, at 209.
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significant demand response occurred.53 Understanding this anomalous (to
economists) market response requires an understanding of the real world
dynamics of the patient-doctor relationship. Empirical research suggests that
in making medical decisions with potentially serious consequences, patients
prefer to have their physician make the key decisions; this result holds even for
patients who want to be fully informed.54 Burdened by uncertainty and regret,
patients may choose to delegate choice to a trusted third party even when they
have sufficient information to act as “rational consumers.”55 Moreover, the
implication of behavioral research regarding patients’ formation of preferences
suggests that improved information on quality may not result in a strong
response in demand.56
In sum, predicting physician behavior in response to economic factors
requires an appreciation of behavioral research. Admittedly, translating the
nascent research in this area into legal and policy prescriptions is fraught with
risk. However, if one accepts both the implications of the behavioral decision
research discussed above and the conclusion of Professor Town and his
colleagues that “nonfinancial incentives such as patient outcomes, autonomy,
regret and peer approval may have as strong or stronger an impact on physician
behavior than financial incentives,”57 a closer look at the assumptions of
economic regulation of physicians is in order. In addition, this research
underscores an often overlooked feature of health care law: The close link
between clinical and economic decisionmaking requires that regulation address
behavioral factors underlying both spheres.
IV. APPLYING BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO HEALTH LAW AND POLICY
QUESTIONS
What might behavioral economics contribute to our understanding of laws
regulating physicians and employing financial incentives? This section
describes topics of potentially fruitful inquiry in three areas involving
significant economic regulation of physicians: (1) regulation of physicians’
fees and use of pay for performance (P4P) tools by Medicare; (2) prohibitions
on self-referrals or accepting remuneration for referrals; and (3) litigation and
regulation designed to encourage competition under antitrust law.

53. Id. at 210.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 206 (“The normative implication is that improved information may not result in an
efficient quality equilibrium in the market unless some other institution is introduced that
overrides . . . [certain kinds of] patient decision-making . . . (e.g. employers guiding provider
choice based on systematic data).”).
57. Town et al., supra note 2, at 93S.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

ECONOMIC REGULATION OF PHYSICIANS

1201

These three topics are compelling because they implicate physician
financial incentives in three different ways:
 Fee regulation and P4P seeks to pick out and reward the efficacious, and
encourage, through payment incentives, what is most worthwhile to
patients.
 Self-referral laws follow an entirely different track: they seek to
discourage market exchanges by denying payment (and imposing legal
sanctions) where physician ownership or contracts act against the goals
of government policy and patient interests.
 Antitrust and competition policy seeks to encourage physician markets
to adopt structures that are efficient and avoid aggregation of
professional power.
The aim here is a modest one: to identify a few areas in which the
perspective of psychological and organizational research can help us
understand how law’s use of financial incentives and financial regulation of
physicians does or does not work.
A.

Physician Fee Setting and Pay-for-Performance Incentives

The most direct regulatory intervention in physicians’ business affairs is
the setting of physician fees for payment by government payors. Using the socalled resource based relative value scale (RBRVS), the Medicare program
seeks to mimic market prices by setting fees that reflect the cost of providing
those services. An important objective of that process is to come up with a
“neutral” set of fees, that is, a fee schedule that does not encourage the
provision of some services over others. In theory, neutral fees will compensate
doctors according to the costs associated with each service, and thus create no
artificial incentive for physicians to induce demand by preferring the more
highly remunerated services.58
To call this process a dismal, horrific failure would be an understatement.
Fees have reflected nothing close to cost and consequently the payment
schedule has encouraged the provision of better paying services over others
and created numerous other distortions in the market. A host of technical and
conceptual problems have plagued the RBRVS process.59 Although attempts
were made to control volume by various means, and later attempts to set by fiat

58. See McGuire, supra note 11, at 269 (characterizing the goal of RBRVS as “taking
physician financial self-interest out of the picture”).
59. Surveying economic and practical critiques of RBRVS, McGuire points out its failure to
determine the actual level of fees (as opposed to relative values); its use of average instead of
marginal costs; its deficiencies in making adjustments reflecting differences attributable to
geography; and its neglect of differences attributable to market power and practice organization.
Id. at 268.
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an appropriate level of growth, administrative pricing has been entirely
ineffective in controlling costs.60 Ultimately, the RBRVS process has morphed
into a politicized rate-making process driven by budgetary concerns, while the
fees themselves have sent distorted economic signals to the market.61
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the RBRVS system, administrative fee
setting by the government will not soon disappear. Although Medicare and
other government entities employ managed care organizations to some extent,
traditional fee-for-service Medicare remains the option chosen by eighty
percent of Medicare beneficiaries;62 moreover, the fees paid by Medicare are
commonly used as a benchmark by other payors.63 To be sure, given almost
universal dissatisfaction with its sustainable growth rate methodology, the
government will likely attempt to revamp its physician payment controls.
Whether a mechanism is developed to restrain volume growth administratively
or by establishing processes that replicate market incentives, it will still be
necessary to determine appropriate fees and to predict physician responses to
those regulatory initiatives.
The nation’s experience with administered prices based on fees for service
offers several insights into physician behavior. There is overwhelming
evidence that physicians are highly responsive to economic incentives
transmitted by government fee schedules.64 Yet attempts to control overall
costs by constructing “neutral” fees have, as we have seen, been unsuccessful.
Distortions in payment by government fee schedules may result in physicians
increasing volume of services (depending on income and substitution effects,
in alternative services or in services reimbursed by other payers); may affect

60. The conversion factor used to translate relative fees into a physician fee schedule is
subject to an annual update determined by a formula—called the sustainable growth rate (SGR)—
set forth in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. It ties physician payment updates to a number of
factors, including growth in input costs, growth in Medicare Fee For Service (FFS) enrollment,
and growth in the volume of physician services relative to growth in the national economy. For
analysis and criticism of the SGR, see MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 81–103 (2008) [hereinafter MEDPAC REPORT],
available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar08_EntireReport.pdf.
61. Paul Ginsburg & Joy M. Grossman, When Price Isn’t Right: How Inadvertent Payment
Incentives Drive Medicare Care, 24 HEALTH AFF. W376, W377 (Web Exclusive, Aug. 9, 2005),
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.376v1.
62. MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 60, at 243–74; see also KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
DATA SPOTLIGHT, MEDICARE PRIVATE FEE-FOR-SERVICE ENROLLMENT AS A SHARE OF THE
TOTAL MEDICARE POPULATION, 2007, http://www.kff.org/charts/060407.htm (last visited Apr. 7,
2009) (“Eight in ten Medicare beneficiaries are in the traditional Fee-For-Service Medicare
program.”).
63. See MEDPAC REPORT, supra 60, at 82.
64. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Grossman, supra note 61 (discussing how problems with feesetting have resulted in undesirable behavior by physicians).
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quality and effort; and can strongly influence physician labor markets.65 It is
likely that several proclivities identified by behavioral scientists contribute to
this phenomenon. For example, particularly when operating under conditions
of uncertainty, status quo bias tends to slow physicians’ responses to price
signals and undermines attempts to recalibrate prices or add inducements, such
as P4P, to change behavior.66 Likewise, evidence suggests that physicians in
many circumstances are overoptimistic in making treatment decisions.67 In the
context of a care delivery environment that is both highly fragmented and lacks
effective feedback regarding outcomes, this factor is likely to increase
physician inducement of demand and undermine the efficiency of price
regulation.
In addition, the effects of professional norms complicate the picture.
Doctors, like other people, tend to follow social norms; moreover, owing to
their training and socialization factors, professional norms have a powerful
influence on behavior.68 There are a number of explanations for the power and
persistence of these factors, among them that following professional norms is
simple, may provide some reassurance that decisions will not be challenged,
and engenders approval among peers. The power of such “intrinsic rewards”
help explain the results of the Wennberg research indicating that much
medicine departs from evidence-based standards of best practice.69
Peter Orszag, former Director of the Congressional Budget Office, recently
underscored the importance of paying closer attention to behavioral economics
and professional norms in formulating policy. Stressing the influence of

65. See MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 60, at 95.
66. See Richard G. Frank, The Health Care Challenge: Some Perspsectives from Behavioral
Economics, in WANTING IT ALL: THE CHALLENGE OF REFORMING THE U.S. HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 61, 66–67 (Jane Sneddon Little ed., 2007). Frank argues that P4P reforms will encounter
“status quo bias” among physicians that “will likely attenuate any response relative to what one
might expect from a ‘purely’ rational, money-oriented doctor,” and therefore, “rewards needed to
‘move practice’ may be larger than expected.” Id.
67. Id. at 67.
68. See generally CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL
FAILURE (2d ed. 2003) (classic study of how the medical profession uniquely detects, categorizes,
and sanctions error).
69. As the Congressional Budget Office has recently observed:
[The wide variation in health care spending across the United States] probably reflects, at
least in part, differences in norms of practice among doctors. Professional norms may
differ by locality because local colleagues may have a disproportionate influence and
because bias favoring the status quo may make norms slow to change in the face of new
evidence.
Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, Statement at the Health Reform Summit of the
Committee on Finance of the United States Senate: Opportunities to Increase Efficiency in Health
Care (June 16, 2008) (transcript at 6) [hereinafter Orszag Statement], available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/93xx/doc9384/06-16-HealthSummit.pdf.
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professional norms and custom, he suggests that “subtle actions might be more
sustainable” than simple reliance by the government on price levels and cost
controls.70 This is a critical point, as the conventional tools relied upon by
economists—generating more information about the relative effectiveness of
medical treatments and changing the incentives for providers and consumers of
health care—have not effectively counteracted the behavioral factors discussed
above.71 That said, the pathway to altering norms and entrenched patterns of
decisionmaking is far from clear. While there is certainly merit to what Orszag
proposes—combining “comparative effectiveness research with aggressive
promulgation of standards and changes in financial and other incentives”72—
one suspects far more needs to be done. Implementing changes in professional
education, integrating the delivery system so as to afford greater opportunity
for coordination and supervision are undoubtedly needed as well. But there is
another side to this coin. Professional norms can serve as a counterweight to
self-interested pricing behaviors. In many contexts, “shaming” of physicians
has been a time-honored method of rebuke, and in some cases has proven more
powerful than the threat of legal sanctions.73
B.

Self-Referral and Fraud and Abuse Laws

Federal and state anti-kickback and self-referral laws place restrictions on
the financial relationships between physicians and other entities, generally
prohibiting, among other things, doctors from owning or receiving
remuneration from entities or facilities to which they make patient referrals.74

70. Id.
71. As Orszag concludes, “Research suggests . . . that the merely providing information to
physicians results in an ‘exceedingly modest behavioral response.’” Id. (transcript at 7) (quoting
David E. Kanouse et al., Dissemination of Effectiveness and Outcomes Research, 34 HEALTH
POL’Y 167–92 (1995)); see also, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL
ROLE (2007) (discussing the various factors that contribute to regional disparities of the
treatments physicians use and their costs).
72. Orszag Statement, supra note 69, (transcript at 7).
73. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 1019–21 & nn.240–44; see also BOSK, supra note 68.
74. The federal self-referral law (the so-called Stark Statute) prohibits physicians who have
(or whose immediate family members have) a “financial relationship” with a provider from
referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to that provider for “designated health services.” 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000). The federal anti-kickback law similarly prohibits professionals,
providers, or suppliers from “knowingly and willfully” paying or receiving, offering or soliciting
“remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly,
in cash or in kind” in return for referring a patient or for arranging or furnishing a service paid for
by a federal health care program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b (2000). Both statutes are subject to
numerous exceptions, or safe harbors, and to an extensive body of interpretive regulations,
guidelines, and advisory opinions. See generally ALICE GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
FRAUD AND ABUSE (2008).
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These laws have generated considerable controversy and in some cases
outright resistance among physicians in the form of noncompliance, persistent
petitions for amendment and repeal, and the establishment of a bewilderingly
complex assortment of regulatory loopholes. The core purposes of these laws
are to prevent costly self-interested behavior by physicians and to preserve the
physician-patient relationship by eliminating conflicts of interest. Critics claim
these laws work against their very purposes: they prevent cost-effective
cooperation between doctors and facilities and work against patients’ desire for
The problems self-referral law has
convenient access to services.75
encountered emanate from a paradigmatic tension between the core
assumptions of economic regulation and the human dynamics of professional
decisionmaking.
The behavioral perspective offers an appreciation of the multiple
incentives, other than the economic, which operate in the self-referral context.
As we have seen, there is no question but that economic self interest strongly
influences physician choice as to treatments.76 But our understanding of the
factors that underlie those motivations is far from complete. Behavioral
research provides at least suggestive evidence that myriad psychological and
sociological factors drive physician attitudes regarding referrals.77 A large
body of scholarship demonstrates that physicians have a strong sense of
ownership and investment in their patients.78 Coupled with endowment
effects, other cognitive biases, such as saliency and overconfidence,
understanding the metabolism of referral decisions will likely require a far
more complex account than a simple narrative focusing on economic
motivation. Finally, social and professional norms may militate strongly
against rules or arrangements perceived to interfere with physician
autonomy.79 This factor undoubtedly gives rise to resistance to organizations
and rules that place what are seen as arbitrary and non-clinical limits on patient
management. The net consequences where the foregoing tendencies are
prominent are behaviors that may be resistant to regulatory law relying solely
on economic incentives.

75. See, e.g., Timothy J. Aspinwall, The Anti-Kickback Statute Standard(s) of Intent: The
Case for a Rule of Reason Analysis, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 182 (2000).
76. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
77. See e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law—We Need to Talk!,
19 HEALTH AFF. 84, 101 (noting that the law often takes a highly critical view of physician
referral incentives, even when the referral is in the best interest of the patient).
78. See KATHRYN MONTGOMERY, HOW DOCTORS THINK 199–200 (2006).
79. Reviewing the literature on extrinsic rewards and professional socialization, Golden and
Sloan conclude that “pay is only one kind of reward and physicians may consider other
rewards . . . equally or more valuable.” Brian R. Golden & Frank A. Sloan, Physician Pay for
Performance: Alternative Perspectives, in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE, supra note
11, at 289, 303–04.
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Unpacking the social and psychological factors affecting preferences and
choice would be of great help to health law and policy. Where these factors
support economic disincentives to relinquish control, because they distort
preferences and choice, the regulatory response may well require attention to
medical education and socialization. Making preference and choice of
referrals the subject of professional norms might add as a significant factor for
reinforcing regulatory commands. To the extent behavioral factors are
influenced by organizational arrangements, such as the composition and
financial infrastructure of group practices, the policy response may be to
promote (e.g., by payment policies or regulatory safe harbors) organizations
that encourage arrangements that are less likely to foster such problems.80
To be sure, finding the right mix of noneconomic and economic measures
is far from easy. While some steps, such as redirection of professional norms
and providing persuasive data regarding referrals and outcomes, may be
helpful to reinforce economic rewards and penalties, there is a risk that such
measures may operate at cross purposes. Some theoretical and empirical work
suggests that after a certain level of “extrinsic rewards” (pay, vacation time,
incentive bonuses) is reached, physicians may give equal or greater weight to
“intrinsic rewards” (status, peer acceptance, satisfaction from performance of
difficult tasks).81 The point is cogently illustrated by studies finding that
paying physicians’ salaries diminished their professional and institutional
commitments as they came to regard themselves as having more of a financial
relationship to their patients and hospitals.82 The central lesson is that to
effectively influence behavior (assure compliance, minimize repeated attempts
to whittle the law away by lobbying for loopholes, reduce uncertainty), the law
needs to adopt or encourage measures, financial and otherwise, that address the
professional norms and psychological factors discussed.
C. Antitrust and Competition Policy
Competition policy in the eighties and nineties was predicated on a model
that assumed the incentives of competition would cause physicians to form
group practices or form joint ventures or networks that minimized cost and
promoted efficient delivery of care. It did not work out that way. In most of
the country, physicians remained in small practices or joined small single
specialty groups; instead of joining integrated multispecialty practices or
integrated delivery systems, the large majority of physicians joined multiple

80. See Town et al., supra note 2, at 104S–110S (discussing how physicians’ organizational
structures affect regulatory and payment incentives).
81. Golden & Sloan, supra note 79, at 302.
82. Id.; Janet M. Dukerich et al., Beauty Is in the Eye of the Beholder: The Impact of
Organizational Identification, Identity, and Image on the Cooperative Behaviors of Physicians,
47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 507, 529 (2002).
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preferred provider organizations (PPOs), which engaged in little integration.83
In addition, despite their propensity to deliver more cost-effective care, health
plans featuring capitated payments or other financial incentives did not gain
traction in many regions of the country.84 This lack of take-up confounded
legal and regulatory policies, such as antitrust law enforcement, which were
directed rather explicitly at encouraging the formation of risk-sharing networks
and clinical integration at the delivery level.
The question for advocates of competition policy has been why seemingly
cost-effective organizational and financing systems did not triumph in the
marketplace. It seems clear now that a host of factors conspired to defeat the
emergence of a fully realized managed competition model. Some argue that
legislation adopted in response to abuses—the managed care backlash—
undermined the most effective tools of managed care;85 others note the failure
to deliver lower costs in the market.86 However, a more complete explanation
of the failure of the managed care model requires an understanding of why
seemingly powerful economic incentives proved insufficient to motivate
significant integration among physicians and between physicians and hospitals.
Behavioral economics may help shed light on the puzzle. To begin with,
various cognitive factors and norms may have acted as powerful
counterweights to financial incentives created by emerging managed care
plans. For example, most physicians are members of multiple health plans,
and these plans vary significantly in their protocols and requirements for
compensation and bonuses, utilization review, and other factors.87 Physicians
appear to adopt heuristics to deal with the complexity of complying with the
requirements of multiple payers, and their treatment patterns may reflect the
requirements of the overall mix of plans they participate in, rather than the
requirements of the plan of each patient.88 Research shows that physicians’
therapeutic decisions tend to cluster around the protocols of their median
insurance plan, which results in the same level of care for all patients,

83. Hoangmai H. Pham & Paul B. Ginsburg, Unhealthy Trends: The Future of Physician
Services, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1586, 1589–90 (2007); see also Alain C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen,
Competition in Health Care: It Takes Systems to Pursue Quality and Efficiency, 24 HEALTH
AFF.,W420, at W423 (Web Exclusive, Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.420v1.
84. See Pham & Ginsburg, supra note 83, at 1590.
85. See Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunnit, 47 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 365, 381–82 (2003).
86. Id. at 369.
87. See FRANK, supra note 5, at 211–12 (noting that physicians typically encounter fifteen or
more compensation schemes and a similar number of drug formularies).
88. See Richard G. Frank & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Custom-Made Versus Ready-to-Wear
Treatments: Behavioral Propensities in Physicians’ Choices, 26 J. HEALTH ECON. 1101, 1108
(2007)
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regardless of the relative generosity of any individual patient’s plan.89 In
addition, professional norms tend to reinforce physicians’ unwillingness to
conform treatments to the requirements of each patient’s plan. That is, norms
of fairness and professional responsibility likely instill a sense of obligation to
devote equal time and effort to similar cases regardless of specific plan
requirements.90
Also working against the emergence of the managed care model was the
resistance of physicians to integrate into group practices.91 Physicians’
unwillingness to abandon longstanding experience with autonomous practice
likely reflects a status quo bias and a degree of risk aversion. Moreover,
professional norms militating against “corporate practice of medicine” (though
historically aimed at lay-control) likely reinforce many physicians’ hesitancy
to enter into new practice arrangements. Likewise, the move to taking on
financial risk or employment by health systems constituted a sea change for
many physicians. To be sure, the experience of full employment of physicians
by hospitals proved to be less than a complete success. In a large number of
cases hospitals found their investments in physician practices unprofitable, as
salaried doctors appeared to change practice patterns, working with less
intensity than expected. Though not rigorously studied, it would not be
surprising to find that the changed norms and expectations encountered in the
employment setting, coupled with long held professional norms, underlay the
altered behavior of physicians once their practice was acquired.92
CONCLUSION
Legal academics have for many years contrasted two paradigms of health
care law and policy: a professional/scientific model and a market model. The
professional model assumed that health markets were sufficiently distinct
economically to warrant professional autonomy and limited government
intervention into professional economic affairs. By contrast, the marketoriented model—which was ascendant in the late 1980s and 1990s—assumed
away many unique features inherent in the purchase and sale of medical
services; as a result much regulatory law overlooked market imperfections.
89. See id. at 1112–14; Sherry Glied & Joshua Graff Zivin, How Do Doctors Behave When
Some (but Not All) of Their Patients Are in Managed Care?, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 337, 352
(2002).
90. Frank, supra note 5, at 208, 212. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV.728 (1986) (finding
that considerations of fairness, or “perceptions of transactors’ entitlements[,] affect the
substantive outcomes of exchanges” and may prevent market equilibrium).
91. See Pham & Ginsburg, supra note 83, at 1590.
92. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Buying Doc Practices Often Leads to Red Ink: Hospitals Have
Been Snapping Up Medical Groups, but Successfully Managing and Integrating Them Has
Proved a Challenge, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 1996, at 39.
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Today, perhaps by default, the market model remains salient, but its dominant
position has been sharply questioned. Regulators and the legal establishment
should seek to gain a greater understanding of how non-economic and
behavioral factors influence physicians’ economic decisions and channel this
understanding to correct and improve market outcomes.
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